How populist democracy promotes market liberalization by Grosjean, Pauline & Senik, Claudia
How populist democracy promotes market liberalization
Pauline Grosjean, Claudia Senik
To cite this version:
Pauline Grosjean, Claudia Senik. How populist democracy promotes market liberalization.
PSE Working Papers n2008-39. 2008. <halshs-00586284>
HAL Id: halshs-00586284
https://halshs.archives-ouvertes.fr/halshs-00586284
Submitted on 15 Apr 2011
HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access
archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci-
entific research documents, whether they are pub-
lished or not. The documents may come from
teaching and research institutions in France or
abroad, or from public or private research centers.
L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est
destine´e au de´poˆt et a` la diffusion de documents
scientifiques de niveau recherche, publie´s ou non,
e´manant des e´tablissements d’enseignement et de
recherche franc¸ais ou e´trangers, des laboratoires
publics ou prive´s.
  
 
 
 
 
 WORKING PAPER N° 2008 - 39 
 
 
 
How populist democracy promotes market liberalization 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Pauline Grosjean 
 
Claudia Senik 
 
 
 JEL Codes: D63, H1, H53, I38, O1, P26 
 Keywords: Democracy, income inequality, redistribution, 
market liberalization, trust 
  
 
 
PARIS-JOURDAN SCIENCES ECONOMIQUES 
LABORATOIRE D’ECONOMIE APPLIQUÉE - INRA 
 
48, BD JOURDAN – E.N.S. – 75014 PARIS 
TÉL. : 33(0) 1 43 13 63 00   –   FAX : 33 (0) 1 43 13 63 10 
www.pse.ens.fr 
 
CENTRE NATIONAL DE LA  RECHERCHE SCIENTIFIQUE – ÉCOLE DES HAUTES ÉTUDES EN SCIENCES SOCIALES 
ÉCOLE NATIONALE DES PONTS ET CHAUSSÉES – ÉCOLE NORMALE SUPÉRIEURE 
 
 1 
 
How Populist Democracy Promotes Market Liberalization 
Pauline Grosjean (University of California at Berkeley) and Claudia Senik (Paris School of Economics) 
July 22, 2008 
Abstract 
Using a new set of micro evidence from an original survey of 28 transition countries, we show that 
democracy increases citizens’ support for the market by guaranteeing income redistribution to inequality-
averse agents. Our identification strategy relies on the restriction of the sample to inhabitants of open 
borders between formerly integrated countries, where people face the same level of market development 
and economic inequality, as well as the same historically inherited politico-economic culture. Democratic 
rights increase popular support for the market. This is true, in particular, of inequality-averse agents, 
provided that they trust political institutions. Our findings suggest that one solution to the recent electoral 
backlash of reformist parties in the former socialist block lies in a deepening of democracy.  
JEL codes: D63, H1, H53, I38, O1, P26. 
Keywords: Democracy, income inequality, redistribution, market liberalization, trust.  
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1. Introduction 
Is democracy an obstacle to development, market liberalization and growth, or does it eventually appear 
as a necessary condition to these evolutions? An important body of economic literature, largely inspired 
by the example of China and other South-East Asian countries, claims that postponing political 
liberalization gives more leeway to reformers when reform measures potentially hurt important groups of 
the population (Aslund, Boone and Johnson, 2001; Dewatripont and Roland, 1992; Roland, 2001; Roland 
and Verdier 2003). The belief that concentrating power in the hands of one party, forbidding the 
expression of political opposition, is a more efficient way to conduct a development strategy is sometimes 
referred as the Lee’s hypotheses, from the name of Singapore’s leader Lee Kuan Yew (Sen 1999). This 
idea is also present in the “public choice” theory of the relationship between democracy and capitalism. 
According to Dan Usher (1981), a disciple of Hayek, universal suffrage and majority rule endanger the 
capitalist system, for the majority may vote to expropriate the rich minority.  
By contrast, the idea that democracy can be a fertile ground for market liberalization is more rarely found. 
An important channel through which democracy is supposed to help market development is via its 
expected effects on income redistribution. More precisely, the contestability of the ruling party, put in 
competition with other organized political groups, appears as the necessary condition for a party to 
credibly commit to the provision of social insurance and income redistribution1. This is because political 
                                                     
1 For evidence that democracy actually improves distributional outcomes, see Rodrik (1999 and 2000). 
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competition creates the possibility that the ruling party loses his constituency in case he does not live up 
to his promises. Acemoglu and Robinson (2000, 2002), Acemoglu, Bautista, Querubin and Robinson 
(2007a) and Robinson (2006) have developed the idea that when economic development unlashes income 
inequality, which itself triggers backlash against reforms, extending democratic rights appears as a 
credible promise of future income redistribution. Absent such institutional safeguards, rising inequality, in 
itself, would generate opposition to further market reform and may even impose a threat to the regime 
(Alesina and Perotti 1996). 
In the case of Latin America, for example, where economic liberalization has not been accompanied by 
adequate social safety nets, the ensuing economic insecurity has been identified as one major cause of the 
recent reform backlash (Rodrik 2000). This view also seems relevant to the experience of transition 
countries. The rise in economic inequality that has been triggered by the transition from a planned to a 
market economy is well-documented. Fleming and Micklewright (2000), Milanovic (1998, 1999) and 
Keane and Prasad (2000), among other papers, have described how market forces have driven wage 
differentiation and the rising share of income from self-employment and property. Rising inequality in 
turn, has been shown to generate popular opposition to market reforms (Denisova, Eller, Frye and 
Zhuravskaya, 2008; Desai and Olofsgard, 2006; Grosfeld and Senik, 2008; Krastev, 2007). The 
denunciation of widespread corruption, of confiscation of power by the elite, and of lack of transparency 
in the distribution of the aggregate gains from transition, has undermined popular adhesion to the process 
of reforms and brought back to power former communist candidates or radically conservative anti-
European parties (Krastev 2007; Rupnik 2007). It thus seems that in transition countries, restoring 
popular support to the strategy of development based on market liberalization now implies increasing 
political transparency and the commitment of the government to keep income differentiation under 
control.  
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However, this supposes that democracy performs efficiently its instrumental role in keeping governments 
responsible and accountable to the majority (Sen 1999), and is not subverted by the wealthy and 
politically powerful (Glaeser, Scheinkman and Shleifer 2003). In a recent paper, Acemoglu, Ticchi and 
Vindingli (2007b) present a model of democratic capture, where the rich, in young democracies, may 
promote an inefficient state structure in order to limit income redistribution. Hence, not only does the 
formal transition to democracy matter, but also the degree of capture of democratic institutions by the 
elite and the bureaucracy, and more generally the degree of effectiveness and reliability of the procedures 
associated with formal rights. This qualitative element can be captured by the trust that the majority of 
people place in democratic institutions. Political trust has indeed been described as the link between 
citizens and the institutions that represent them (Bianco, 1994). In sum, the subjective perception of the 
quality of democracy depends on popular trust in the country’s institutions as much as on formal rights. 
This is particularly true in new democracies, such as those of the former socialist bloc (Mishler and Rose 
1997).  
Accordingly, the present paper investigates the impact of democratic rights on citizens’ support for the 
market, assuming that the relation is mediated by the degree of political trust that citizens place in 
political institutions. It hinges on a new set of micro evidence from an original survey of 28 transition 
economies, the Life in Transition Survey, which was implemented in 2006 (see EBRD, 2007a). In a 
companion paper, Grosjean and Senik (2007) proposed a new identification strategy based on frontier-
zones, and found that democracy reinforces individuals’ belief in the market as a superior form of 
economic system. This paper starts from this finding and proposes a mechanism explaining this 
relationship. 
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Recent empirical work points to a reinforcing effect of political liberalization on economic liberalization 
at the macroeconomic level (Giavazzi and Tabellini 2005). Studies related to Central and Eastern Europe, 
with the exception of Finifter and Mickiewicz (1992), find that democracy facilitates economic 
liberalization (Fidrmuc, 2003; Hayo, 2004). However, demonstrating empirical relations of causality 
between democracy and market liberalization is a daunting task (Persson and Tabellini, 2007). This is 
because of the identification problem, which is contained in the very idea of the modernization theory 
(Lipset 1959) that the same development dynamics favor both democracy and market development. 
Subjective support to the market may be due both to the degree of democracy and to the degree of market 
development itself, which are difficult to disentangle as they are likely to develop at a parallel pace. 
Moreover, these subjective political attitudes altogether are likely to be influenced by common cultural 
and historical factors which are difficult to capture. Hence, assessing the direction of causality between 
the advancement of economic freedom and the degree of political freedom appears to be an almost 
impossible exercise in the absence of a valid exogenous instrument. Example of such instruments are 
legal origins (La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer and Vishny, 1999) or colonial origins (Acemoglu, 
Johnson and Robinson, 2001).  
In order to overcome these difficulties, we propose an identification strategy based on the specificities of 
frontier-zones. Our main assumption is that people who live in an integrated frontier-zone (in terms of 
labor and product mobility) share the same experience of the market and, often, the same historically 
inherited “cultural attitudes” towards the market and democracy, on both sides of the frontier. The 
assumption that frontier-zones are culturally and economically highly integrated is particularly plausible 
for the often artificial frontiers of the former USSR and for some formerly integrated regions such as the 
Ottoman Empire or the Austro-Hungarian Empire. This allows us to identify the pure influence of 
different levels of democracy across nations, avoiding the simultaneity and omitted variable bias. 
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Our main focus is on the effect of a three way interaction between democracy, political trust and the 
demand for income redistribution by the state. We find a positive and significant impact of this triple 
interaction on the support for market liberalization.  The main result of this paper is that inequality-averse 
individuals are more supportive of the market when they live in more democratic states and trust 
democratic institutions (even though the direct effect of inequality aversion is to reduce support to the 
market).  
This mechanism provides a possible explanation of the link between democracy and support for the 
market that was identified by Grosjean and Senik (2007) in a companion paper, or by Giavazzi and 
Tabellini (2005). Our interpretation is also consistent with the optimal sequencing of reforms as described 
by Dewatripont and Roland (1995). The authors show that implementing a first reform that benefits a 
majority with small gains increases the ex ante acceptability of a second reform that benefits a minority 
with large gains. Reinterpreting the first reform as democracy and the second as market reform, our 
results confirm this prediction. Our interpretation is also consistent with theoretical considerations of a 
complementarity between democracy and the market (Lindblom 1995).  
This paper suggests that democratic governance can play an instrumental role in overcoming 
redistributive conflicts that could block the construction of a viable market economy. The same is true of 
income redistribution. The first order negative effect of redistributive policies on growth (Persson and 
Tabellini 1994; Alesina and Rodrik 1994) must be weighted by the further acceptance of market reforms.  
 2. Data  
Our study hinges on the Life in Transition Survey (LITS), a survey conducted by the European Bank for 
Reconstruction and Development and the World Bank in 2006, in 28 post-transition countries and 
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Turkey2. Respondents to the survey were drawn randomly, using a two stage sampling method, with 
census enumeration areas as Primary Sampling Units (PSUs), and households as secondary sampling 
units. The survey includes 1000 observations per country, making a total of 29000 observations. 
Descriptive statistics are presented in Appendix.  
Frontier zones 
The Life in Transition survey is based on PSUs3, each containing 20 observations (surveyed persons). We 
used the geographical map of the survey to identify groups of PSUs that are located on both sides and in 
the immediate vicinity of a political frontier. We identified 36 valid frontier-zones that contain between 
40 and 460 observations, concentrated in 2 (Slovak Republic-Ukraine) to 24 (Croatia-Slovenia) PSUs.  
Because the validity of our identification strategy relies on the intensity of market integration on either 
side of borders, we excluded frontiers that are impaired by geographical obstacles or restricted because of 
political tensions and disputed territories. We thus excluded the frontiers between Georgia and Russia, 
Armenia and Azerbaijan, Moldova and Ukraine, as well as all Uzbek borders. We verified that the degree 
of market development is more similar between two adjacent frontier-zones than it is on average between 
two adjacent countries. We constructed an index of market development that reflects the share in regional 
                                                     
2 Turkmenistan was not included in the survey, neither was Kosovo. We exclude Turkey from our sample 
because its borders with the other countries were closed during the whole socialist period, which is in 
contradiction with our identification assumption. 
3 PSUs were selected randomly, with probability proportional to size. 
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employment of small and medium sized, private and newly created enterprises (since 1989). On average, 
the correlation between indices of industrial market development is twice as high between adjacent 
frontier-zones as it is between adjacent countries. If one restricts the analysis to subsets of formerly more 
integrated countries, the proximity between adjacent frontier-zones appears even higher. For instance, in 
Central Asia, the correlation between two adjacent frontier-zones is 0.78 against 0.34 in two adjacent 
countries. We also checked that the structure of industrial employment in terms of occupation and 
industry is identical on either side of the borders, whereas this is not true of entire adjacent countries (for 
more details see Grosjean and Senik 2007).  
Support for the market and demand for income redistribution  
Support for the market is proxied by the probability of choosing the first item of the following survey 
question:  
Which of the following statements do you agree with most? 
- A market economy is preferable to any other form of economic system 
- Under some circumstances, a planned economy may be preferable to a market economy 
- For people like me, it does not matter whether the economic system is organized as a market 
economy or as a planned economy 
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Support for the market is rather low in the region. Averaging across countries4 of the sample, support for 
the market as defined above reaches 43% (see Denisova, Eller, Frye and Zhuravskaya 2008, for possible 
explanations). Descriptive statistics based on our data confirm the negative association between income 
inequality and support for the market at the country level (see figure 1). 
We measure the demand for redistribution using the following question: 
Do you think the state should be involved in reducing the gap between the rich and the poor? 
Scale: not involved at all/let the market play =1; Somewhat/moderately involved =2; strongly involved=3  
There is overwhelming support in favor of state intervention across the region. On average, 5% of 
respondents favor no intervention, 26% support a moderate intervention and 69% desire a strong 
intervention of the state to reduce income gaps. Support for the market is particularly low among those 
who favor more state intervention, as can be seen in Figure 2. People are also particularly favorable to 
strong state intervention in countries where inequalities are large, as can be seen in Figure 3. For example 
in the FYR Macedonia, one of the most unequal countries of the region, with a Gini coefficient of 39 in 
2003 (World Development Indicators), the market is thought to be “preferable to any other form of 
economic system” by only 34% of respondents, and 85% of respondents are in favor of the state being 
“strongly” involved in the reduction of inequalities. By contrast, in adjacent Serbia, where inequality is 
lower (the Gini coefficient in 2003 was 30), 45% of respondents support the market and “only” 80% are 
favorable to a strong state intervention to reduce income gaps.  
                                                     
4 In this section, averages correspond to the arithmetic sums of country averages.  
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Indices of Democracy and Trust 
In order to build a score of democracy, we mainly rely on the Freedom House Nations in Transit 
democracy index (Freedom House, 2006a), which is constructed as an average of measures of the 
electoral process, civil society, independent media, independence of the judicial system, and corruption. It 
takes values from 1 to 7, with 1 representing the highest level of democratic progress and 7 the lowest. 
(We have recoded it in order to present the score of democracy in an ascending order). This index of 
democracy is the best suited for our purpose for several reasons. Firstly, it is the most comprehensive and 
detailed indicator for the transition region. In particular, it is the only index that provides a separate score 
for Serbia and Montenegro; it allows discriminating among countries of our sample better than other 
indicators, such as Polity IV (CIDCM 2006). Secondly, it is more focused on democratic rights than many 
other indices. For example, the Freedom in the World (Freedom House 2006b) indicator takes into 
account such things as freedom of associational rights, and personal autonomy, which do not directly 
assess the ability of the regime to satisfy the demand for redistribution of agents; while the Bertelsmann 
Transformation Index (BTI) takes into account the development of the market economy, hence does not 
fit our identification strategy.   
Nevertheless, an important drawback of all these indicators is that they rely principally on expert ratings. 
They may not reflect adequately the average opinion of citizens about the quality of democratic 
institutions, in particular in young political regimes of the CIS. The quality of formal rights may not 
matter without the actual feeling of empowerment and control by the majority over political institutions. 
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We hence exploit, in addition to standard democracy scores, a measure of individuals’ trust in institutions 
that are characteristics of a functioning democracy, using responses to the following question5: 
To what extent do you trust the following institutions? 
Scale: Complete distrust=1, Some distrust=2, Neither trust nor distrust=3, Some trust=4, Complete 
trust=5, Difficult to say=6 
- The government/cabinet of ministers 
- The parliament  
- Courts 
- Political parties6 
                                                     
5 The question explores trust in a larger number of institutions, such as religious institutions, armed 
forces, the police, foreign investors, etc. However, we only select those institutions that reflect a 
functioning democracy.  
6 The question explores trust in a larger number of institutions. The survey question also included other 
political institutions, such as religious institutions, foreign investors, the presidency, the army or the 
police. We only selected those institutions that reflect a functioning democracy, excluding the army and 
the police, which are not directly related to a democratic regime, and not at all related to the ability of 
such regimes to conduct redistributive policies. We also excluded the presidency because of the possible 
ambiguity between the presidential institution and the man who takes up the position. Actually, because 
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We construct an index that takes value 1 if the respondent either has “some trust’ or ‘complete trust in any 
of the above item. Our trust score is then the sum of these individual indices. It takes an average value of 
1.21. 
This measure of trust in institutions tends to be higher in countries of the CIS and, particularly in Central 
Asia, although these countries fare rather badly in terms of political rights. It reaches a maximal value of 
2.93 in Tajikistan; and a minimum value of 0.59 in Croatia. However, national differences are not central 
to our identification strategy, which relies on the attitudes of individuals located in frontier-zones, inside 
historically integrated cultural zones. Focusing on pairs of adjacent countries, the index of trust seems to 
reflect more accurately the quality of institutions: it is higher in Slovenia (1.18), the Slovak Republic 
(1.12) and Hungary (1.09) compared with their neighbors; Among Central Asian countries, Tajikistan has 
made noticeable progress in terms of political accountability, as compared with its neighbors (EBRD 
2007b)7.  
Interacting the index of institutional trust and the Freedom House Nations in Transit (Freedom House 
2006a) index of democracy, we intend to capture not only the formal quality of institutions, but also 
people’s perception of their empowerment, which is what ultimately determines their belief in the 
government’s ability to ensure redistributive justice.  
                                                                                                                                                                           
of this confusion, the question was censored in Belarus. In addition, this would have raised comparability 
problems.  
7 Although Tajikistan ranks below Kyrgyzstan in the Freedom House indicator, the country has known 
none of the political agitation that took place in Kyrgyzstan or Uzbekistan in the last few years.  
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3. Empirical Strategy 
The purpose of this paper is to investigate the link between democracy and the subjective support for 
market development. We test the conjecture that there is a complementarity between popular support for 
market development and the ability of a democratic system to correct the negative outcomes of the 
market, ability that must be sanctioned by popular trust. There are three elements to this conjecture. 
Firstly, it supposes that income inequality arises as a negative outcome of market development 
(Milanovic 1999), and, in turn, undermines popular support for further market liberalization (Grosfeld and 
Senik 2008). Secondly, it relies on the hypothesis that a democratic government provides a better 
commitment to redistribution than an autocratic government (cf. Acemoglu and Robinson 2002). Thirdly, 
it implies that not only formal rights matter but also the trust in the ability of democratic institutions to 
channel the demands of the majority. We are thus specifically interested in the effect of a three way 
interaction between democracy, political trust and attitudes towards the role of the state in reducing 
inequalities. Finding a positive and significant impact of this interaction on the support for market 
liberalization would show that when people trust that the government can correct the inequality generated 
by market development, their subjective support for the market is enhanced.  
We would thus like to estimate the following relation: 
Support for market ij = a0 + a1 Democracy j + a2 Trustij + a3 Preferences for Redistributionij + a4 
Democracyj*Trustij* Preferences for Redistributionij + a5 Xij + a6Cj + ui (1) 
where pair-wise interactions between the three variables of interests are controlled for; Democracyj 
corresponds to the level of democracy in country j, Trustij corresponds to the level of political trust of 
individual i in country j, Attitudes to Inequalitiesij corresponds to individual preferences for redistribution 
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of respondent i in country j, Xijk stands for the socio-demographic characteristics of respondent i in 
country j, Cj is a vector of country dummies and ui the error term.  
We are particularly interested in the sign and significance of the coefficient of the above three way 
interaction. Our hypothesis is that: a4 >0. 
However, as detailed in the next paragraph, estimating equation (1) would run into serious identification 
problems.  
Empirical challenges: endogeneity and omitted variable biases 
The identification of the relation sketched in equation (1) faces two major empirical challenges. Firstly, 
omitted cultural factors are likely to be essential determinants not only of attitudes towards the market, 
but also of attitudes towards inequality, as well as of political trust8. Second, all the variables under 
consideration (political trust, subjective support for the market, as well as the current level of economic 
inequality and consequently people’s attitudes to inequality) are certainly endogenous to the level of 
market development itself.  
In order to overcome this endogeneity bias, we need to find individuals, who, in an exogenous way, face 
the same level of market development, and thus the same level of economic inequalities, but live under 
                                                     
8 Two main theories explain the origin of political trust (Mishler and Rose 1997). Cultural theories 
consider that trust is mainly exogenous, in that it is deeply rooted in beliefs and cultural norms and is 
generated though early-life socialization (Putnam 1993). By contrast, institutional theories consider that 
political trust is endogenous to the performance of institutions. 
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different democratic institutions, in terms of both formal and effective rights. In order to overcome the 
cultural bias, we need to restrict our sample to people who also share a common cultural heritage. In other 
words, the relation that we must consider is not equation 1 but the following system of equations: 
Support for the Market ij = a0 + a1 Democracy j + a2 Trustij +  a3 Preference for Redistributionij + a4 
Democracyj* Trustij* Preference for Redistributionij +  a6  Degree of Market Development j + a7 Cultural 
Factors j +a8 Xij + a9Cj + ui  (2.1)       
Trustij= b0 +b1 Degree of Market Development j + b2 Cultural Factors j +b3 Xij + b4Cj + vi (2.2) 
Preference for Redistributionij = c0 + c1 Degree of Market Development j + c2 Cultural Factors j +c3 Xij + 
c4Cj + wi (2.3) 
where Xij stands for the socio-demographic characteristics of respondent i in country j, Cj is a vector of 
country dummies, ui, vi and wi are the error term and pair-wise interactions between the three variables of 
interest are controlled for in equation (2.1).  
Identification strategy 
The idea is to match observations in frontier-zones. We assume that spatial economic integration across 
open political borders and labor mobility imply that inhabitants of border zones share the same experience 
of the market even when they live in different countries with different political institutions. We refer the 
reader to Grosjean and Senik (2007) for a discussion of this assumption and empirical evidence. In a 
nutshell, the arguments are the following: (i) the high level of inter-regional trade in frontier zones, (ii) 
frequent migration flows across borders, (iii) the specific historical integration of the countries of the 
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former USSR. Clearly, the validity of the assumption relies on the level of market integration across the 
borders of the surveyed countries. As stressed in Section 2, we only retain open borders.  
The assumption of market integration at frontier-zones eliminates the risk that the support for market 
liberalization that is measured reflects the actual market development and is contaminated by the level of 
economic inequality. What about “cultural” omitted variables? We hinge on the idea that citizens of 
countries that have belonged to formerly highly integrated zones (the USSR, the Ottoman empire, the 
Austro-Hungarian empire, etc.) share a common culture, i.e. common inherited general attitudes towards 
the market and democracy (cf. Alesina and Fuchs-Schundeln 2007). Beyond this remark, we rely on the 
fact that current frontiers of many transition countries, especially countries of the Commonwealth of 
Independent States (CIS), are more or less artificial divisions of formerly integrated jurisdictions, whose 
citizens have developed common attitudes concerning both market development and political freedom. 
Again, we refer to Grosjean and Senik (2007) for an extensive discussion of these assumptions. 
As explained in section 2, using the LITS survey, we identify frontier-zones as groups of Primary Sample 
Units (PSUs) that are quasi-adjacent and located on both sides of a frontier (less than 30 km from each 
other). In order to measure the degree of democratization of a country, we use the democracy score 
established by the Freedom House Nations in Transit survey (Freedom House, 2006a).  
Our test therefore consists, for observations at frontier-zones between two countries, of regressing 
individual support for the market on an interaction between the index of democratization, political trust 
and demand for redistribution by the state, controlling for frontier-zone dummies and other socio-
demographic characteristics of respondents. 
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Assuming that the level of market development and cultural factors are constant inside a given frontier-
zone, these two terms drop out of each equation of system (2), which can be rewritten as: 
Support for Market ijk = a0 + a1 Democracy j + a2 Trust ijk +  a3 Preferences for Redistributionijk + a4 
Democracyj* Trustijk* Preferences for Redistribution ijk  +  a5 X ijk + + a6 Zk + ui  (3) 
where pair-wise interactions between the three variables of interest are controlled for; Democracyj 
corresponds to the democracy score of country j, Trustijk is the level of political trust of individual i in 
frontier-zone k of country j, Attitudes to Inequalitiesijk measures individual preferences for redistribution 
of respondent i in frontier-zone k of country j, Xijk stands for the socio-demographic characteristics of 
respondent i, Zk is a vector of frontier-zone dummies and ui is the error term. 
Estimating equation (3) is thus a direct test of our main hypothesis (a4 >0), on the sub sample of frontier-
zones. 
We check that pair-wise relations between demand for redistribution, democracy, trust and support for the 
market are signed in the way we hypothesized. As a robustness test, we also verify that we do not obtain 
the same result with another left-hand-side variable instead of support for the market. As possible 
candidates, we consider the subjective support to alternative economic policies, such as state ownership of 
large enterprises, price regulation or guarantee of employment by the state.  
4. Results 
We estimate equation (3) with a linear probability model. Despite some drawbacks of linear probability 
models to estimate limited dependent variables, namely because they may give negative or higher than 
unity predicted values, they make the estimation and analysis of interaction terms much more tractable 
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than  non linear models (Ai and Norton 2003) 9.  We checked that it makes little difference to estimate 
equation (3) using a linear probability model or a logistic regression model10. This is in line with the 
results of Ferrer-i-Carbonell and Frijters (2004) or Pohlman and Leitner (2003).  
Table 1 presents the regression of support for the market on scores of democratization, political trust and 
individual support for income redistribution for the sub-sample of respondents living in open frontier-
zones, controlling for frontier-zone dummies, and clustering at the frontier zone level (equation (3)). 
Column (1) displays Grosjean and Senik (2007)’s earlier result that the direct effect of democratic rights 
is to enhance support for the market, so that political liberalization may “cause” economic liberalization 
(as in Giavazzi and Tabellini 2005). The quantitative effect is quite large: an increase in one standard 
deviation of the Freedom House indicator increases the probability of supporting the market over any 
                                                     
9 In non linear models, in contrast to linear models, the interaction effect is different from the marginal 
effect of the interaction term. Moreover, it is conditional on the independent variables, unlike in linear 
models (Ai and Norton 2003).  
10 Both models perform similarly in terms of overall goodness of fit and significance of individual 
independent variables. Predicted values of the dependent variable by the two models are highly correlated 
(correlation coefficient of 0.9964). One of the main drawbacks of the linear probability model is that it 
may predict values below 0 or higher than 1. However, this is not an important issue in the linear 
estimation of equation (3), where only four negative values and three values higher than 1 are predicted. 
Figure 4 in the Appendix plots the predicted values for the logistic regression and OLS. Predicted means 
of the dependent variable are reported in Table 1.  
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other form of economic system by 7.6 percentage points (1.58*0.048). Columns (2), (3) and (6) show that 
more democratic institutions and higher trust increase individuals’ support to the market. However, the 
effect of political trust alone is hardly significant and quantitatively marginal: an increase in one standard 
deviation of our trust index increases the probability of supporting the market by just over 1 percentage 
point (column 2).  
Column (3) shows that respondents who support income redistribution by the state are precisely those 
who oppose the market: a one standard deviation increase in the demand for redistribution decreases the 
probability of supporting the market by 4 percentage points. Columns (4) and (5) show that trust and 
democracy alone are not enough to turn inequality-averse individuals in favor of the market. However, as 
shown in column (7), among those agents who strongly favor income redistribution by the state and who 
would thus otherwise oppose the market, those who live in a more democratic state and who trust their 
political institutions, favor the market more. Here again, the effect is quite large: an increase in one 
standard deviation of the interaction between the Freedom House indicator, political trust and the demand 
for redistribution increases the probability of supporting a market economy by 7.6 percentage points 
(0.005*15.15). 
Table 1 also displays the effect of other covariates on support for the market. We distinguish three income 
categories (the richest, middle and poorest quintiles inside each country), six educational levels, nine 
occupational categories and employment status (self-employed versus employees). We also control for 
age, age squared and residence in an urban, metropolitan or rural area. The only significant effects are 
those of income, education, employment status and gender. Self-employed workers, male respondents and 
those who hold a university degree tend to be more supportive of the market. Other levels of education 
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have no significant impact. The poorest third of respondents clearly oppose the market and the effect is 
unaffected by whether preferences for redistribution are controlled for or not.  
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Table 1: Democracy and Trust increases the Support for the Market of Inequality Averse Agents 
Dependent variable Support for the Market 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Democracy 0.048***   0.073**  0.049*** 0.084** 
 [0.012]   [0.029]  [0.014] [0.032] 
Trust  0.010*   0.017* 0.006 0.013 
  [0.006]   [0.008] [0.015] [0.016] 
  -0.069*** -0.041 -0.064***  -0.043 State intervention against 
inequalities   [0.018] [0.048] [0.018]  [0.046] 
   -0.009   -0.012 Democracy*State intervention 
against inequalities    [0.011]   [0.011] 
    -0.017**  -0.022*** Trust*State intervervention 
against inequalities     [0.009]  [0.008] 
Democracy*Trust      0.001 -0.012* 
      [0.004] [0.006] 
      0.005** Democracy*Trust*State 
intervention against 
inequalities 
      [0.002] 
Poor -0.077*** -0.075*** -0.074*** -0.076*** -0.073*** -0.076*** -0.074*** 
 [0.019] [0.019] [0.019] [0.019] [0.019] [0.019] [0.019] 
Rich 0.011 0.006 0.003 0.009 0.004 0.012 0.008 
 [0.019] [0.019] [0.019] [0.019] [0.019] [0.020] [0.020] 
Age -0.001 -0.001 0 -0.001 0 -0.001 -0.001 
 [0.003] [0.003] [0.003] [0.003] [0.002] [0.003] [0.002] 
Male 0.045*** 0.050*** 0.048*** 0.042*** 0.048*** 0.045*** 0.043*** 
 [0.011] [0.012] [0.011] [0.009] [0.011] [0.010] [0.009] 
Compulsory education -0.04 -0.032 -0.036 -0.042* -0.034 -0.039 -0.039 
 [0.024] [0.024] [0.024] [0.024] [0.024] [0.025] [0.025] 
Secondary education 0.007 0.022 0.014 0.002 0.018 0.01 0.006 
 [0.030] [0.032] [0.031] [0.029] [0.031] [0.030] [0.029] 
Professional education 0.019 0.023 0.018 0.017 0.021 0.022 0.022 
 [0.028] [0.027] [0.027] [0.027] [0.026] [0.027] [0.026] 
University degree 0.070** 0.078** 0.069** 0.063** 0.071** 0.072** 0.066** 
 [0.030] [0.029] [0.030] [0.029] [0.029] [0.029] [0.028] 
Post graduate degree -0.036 -0.022 -0.023 -0.032 -0.019 -0.032 -0.026 
 [0.072] [0.073] [0.074] [0.072] [0.074] [0.071] [0.071] 
Unemployed -0.008 -0.002 -0.003 -0.007 0.001 -0.006 -0.005 
 [0.025] [0.024] [0.025] [0.026] [0.024] [0.025] [0.025] 
Self-employed 0.079*** 0.088*** 0.084*** 0.071*** 0.081*** 0.076*** 0.070*** 
 [0.026] [0.027] [0.027] [0.025] [0.027] [0.026] [0.025] 
White collar employee 0.044 0.045 0.037 0.038 0.04 0.046 0.04 
 [0.032] [0.031] [0.031] [0.032] [0.030] [0.032] [0.031] 
Blue collar employee -0.005 -0.008 -0.01 -0.006 -0.007 -0.003 -0.005 
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 [0.028] [0.028] [0.028] [0.028] [0.028] [0.028] [0.029] 
Service sector employee 0.035 0.045 0.044 0.037 0.048 0.038 0.039 
 [0.029] [0.029] [0.029] [0.029] [0.028] [0.029] [0.028] 
Farmer or farm worker 0.113* 0.118* 0.118** 0.116* 0.123** 0.116* 0.119* 
 [0.065] [0.061] [0.058] [0.062] [0.058] [0.065] [0.061] 
Pensioner 0.011 0.016 0.017 0.012 0.018 0.011 0.013 
 [0.028] [0.027] [0.028] [0.028] [0.027] [0.027] [0.027] 
Student 0.009 0.004 0.001 0.002 0 0.009 0 
 [0.052] [0.051] [0.050] [0.050] [0.050] [0.052] [0.051] 
Housewife 0.033 0.041 0.038 0.031 0.038 0.034 0.03 
 [0.049] [0.049] [0.049] [0.049] [0.049] [0.049] [0.048] 
Observations 5726 5916 5916 5722 5912 5722 5718 
R2 0.096 0.097 0.102 0.103 0.103 0.097 0.105 
Log likelihood -3790.5 -3932.98 -3916.43 -3766.54 -3908.78 -3784.88 -3755.07 
Predicted mean of dep. variable 0.419 0.429 0.428 0.419 0.429 0.418 0.418 
Notes to Table 1: Democracy is built on the basis of Freedom House (2006a). Controls: frontier zone 
dummies, age squared, urban, rural or metropolitan areas. Omitted categories: young (17 to 34 years old), 
middle income group, lowest education, employee, occupation in army. Robust standard errors adjusted 
for clustering on frontier zones. *** Significant at 1%, ** significant at 5%, * significant at 10%. 
 
The implications of our results are that, as suggested by Acemoglu and Robinson (2000, 2002), 
democracy and trust in the institutions turn people in favor of market reform, by acting in the same way as 
a credible commitment to compensating the negative outcomes of income differentiation. Nevertheless, 
the transfer of formal political power from the elite to the majority during the process of democratization 
is not sufficient. A crucial role is played by political trust, which reflects the feeling of confidence in the 
ability of democratic institutions to perform their instrumental role in keeping governments responsible 
and accountable to the majority.  
Robustness  
In order to go further in the attempt to overcome the omitted variable problem, we run the estimation of 
equation (3) within formerly integrated cultural zones, as discussed in Section 3. This is meant to exclude 
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the influence of politico-economic attitudes inherited from the past, which would create an upward bias 
on the estimation of the relation between democracy, trust and support for the market. 
Table 2 replicates, within each cultural zone, the same regression as shown in column (7) of Table 1, with 
a three way interaction between democracy, political trust and preferences for redistribution (controlling 
for main effects and two way interactions). The (triple) interaction is positive and significant in the new 
members of the European Union, the former USSR and the former Ottoman Empire.  
Table 2: Support for the Market within Cultural Zones 
Dependent  variable Support for the Market 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 Austro-
Hungarian 
Empire 
European 
Union 
Polish 
Lithuanian 
Commonwealth 
Ottoman 
Empire 
USSR 
Democracy 0.311* -0.008 0.024 0.337 0.119** 
 [0.153] [0.125] [0.048] [0.327] [0.044] 
Trust -0.051 0.065 -0.032** -0.221* 0.013 
 [0.062] [0.112] [0.014] [0.105] [0.019] 
0.001 -0.019 0.001 0.035 -0.012 State intervention against 
inequalities [0.013] [0.021] [0.016] [0.029] [0.011] 
0.004 0.005* 0.003 0.008* 0.006* Democracy*Trust*State 
intervention against inequality [0.003] [0.002] [0.006] [0.004] [0.003] 
Observations 1520 1825 1546 1694 2616 
R2 0.112 0.154 0.173 0.118 0.135 
Log likelihood -993 -1166 -956 -1107 -1672 
Notes to Table 2: Controls: frontier zone dummies; income categories (rich, middle class, poor); age; age 
squared; gender; occupation categories; self-employed; education categories; urban, rural or metropolitan 
areas. Robust standard errors adjusted for clustering on frontier zones. *** Significant at 1%, ** 
significant at 5%, * significant at 10%. Democracy is built on the basis of Freedom House (2006a).  Pair-
wise interactions between democracy, trust and demand for redistribution are controlled for. 
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The central element of our interpretation of the link between democracy and support for the market is the 
role of inequality and the demand for income redistribution. We thus try to check whether the effect of 
democratic institutions that we observe actually relies on the redistributive ability of the state and not in 
state intervention in general. The LITS survey contains other questions on state intervention that allow 
distinguishing the demand for income redistribution by the state from other dimensions of state 
intervention in the economy. We use the following set of questions: 
Do you think the state should be involved in the following? 
- Guaranteeing employment  
- Guaranteeing low prices for basic goods and food 
- Ownership of large companies in this country 
- Ownership of gas and electricity companies 
Scale: not involved at all/let the market play =1; somewhat/moderately involved =2; strongly involved=3 
We run four independent regressions of a modified equation (3) where each item of the above question is 
successively substituted to the demand for redistribution. Results are displayed in Table 3. Each column 
presents the regression results for each of the above elements of economic policy. The three way 
interactions between democracy, political trust and the chosen element of state intervention in the 
economy are never significant. We conclude that the effect that we observe in section 4 lies specifically in 
the redistributive ability of democratic institutions and not in other elements of state intervention.  
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Table 3: Robustness: other element of state intervention rather than redistributive justice 
Dependent variable Support for the Market 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 
 
Employment Low price 
food 
Ownership 
large 
companies 
Ownership 
gas & 
electricity 
companies 
Democracy  0.087** 0.083*** 0.015 0.057 
 [0.037] [0.023] [0.027] [0.035] 
State guarantee employment 0.000    
 [0.054]    
State guarantee low prices  0.004   
  [0.040]   
State ownership large companies   -0.092*  
   [0.049]  
State ownership gas & electricity companies    -0.065 
    [0.052] 
Trust  -0.023 -0.024 -0.015 -0.063** 
 [0.022] [0.023] [0.020] [0.029] 
 [0.009]    
-0.001    Democracy*Trust*State guarantee employment 
[0.001]    
 -0.002   Democracy*Trust*State guarantee low prices 
 [0.001]   
  -0.001  Democracy*Trust*State ownership large 
companies   [0.002]  
   -0.001 Democracy*Trust*State ownership gas & 
electricity companies    [0.001] 
Observations 5717 5714 5713 5714 
R2 0.104 0.104 0.103 0.105 
Log likelihood -3759 -3757 -3759 -3754 
Notes to Table 4:Controls: frontier zone dummies; income categories (rich, middle class, poor); age; age 
squared;  gender; occupation categories; self-employed; education categories; urban, rural or metropolitan 
areas. Robust standard errors adjusted for clustering on frontier zones. *** Significant at 1%, ** 
significant at 5%, * significant at 10%. Democracy is built on the basis of Freedom House (2006a). Pair-
wise interactions between democracy, trust and each element of state intervention are controlled for. 
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5. Discussion and Conclusion  
This paper sheds light on the relationship between political democracy and economic liberalism. 
Democratic rights increase popular support for the market. This is true, in particular, of inequality-averse 
agents, provided that they trust political institutions. These findings are consistent with studies that find a 
positive link from political to economic liberalization (Giavazzi and Tabellini 2005; Grosjean and Senik 
2007), or claim that democracy makes economic growth more sustainable by delivering better 
distributional outcomes (Rodrik 2000).  
To be sure, this paper only illustrates a static relationship between democracy and income redistribution 
on the one hand and support for market reforms on the other hand. Nevertheless, it is consistent with a 
dynamic view of historical evolution. An example is nineteen century’s Europe, where the extension of 
voting rights that led to unprecedented redistributive programs can be viewed as a strategy of the elite to 
avoid political unrest and revolution, which in turn was fed by rising inequalities due to economic 
development and industrialization (Acemoglu and Robinson 2000). This paper points to a strong 
complementarity between democratization and market reforms. It sheds some light on the “death of the 
liberal consensus” in central Europe: according to Krastev (2007) or Rupnik (2007), the latter is 
attributable to the lack of democracy. The authors describe the transition period as one characterized by a 
tight control by political elites and a lack of political debate or of any real alternative opposition: “voters 
could change governments, but could not change policies” (Krastev, 2007, p59). For example, as 
described by Krastev (2007), the reform of the welfare state was never really an issue of the political 
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debate; political elite colluded over strict liberal economic policies11. This conjunction between the lack 
of real political alternative and the rising economic inequality has certainly reinforced the appeal of 
populist policies.  
However, the recent success of populist parties in many central European countries does not necessarily 
imply the death of the reform process; it could also exert a positive impact, on both democracy and 
market reform, by creating the formerly missing political debate (Schmitter 2006). In Ralf Dahrendorf’s 
words: “one man’s populism is another’s democracy” (cited in Krastev 2007, p59). Furthermore, the 
establishment of social safety nets and redistributive policies may in turn allow for a deepening of market 
reforms, as is illustrated in this paper. 
In sum, this paper suggests that democracy and market reforms are complementary; as better 
distributional outcomes can be guaranteed by democracy. A possible counter-example is provided by the 
experience of some East Asian countries, where market reforms were accomplished without 
democratization. However, as noted by Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson (2001), development in many 
Asian countries was not accompanied by rising inequalities, which is identified here as the main stall to 
economic reform that has to be overcome by a deepening of democracy. Countries like Taiwan or South 
Korea have developed along a non-democratic but egalitarian reform path, a strategy that is more the 
exception than the rule in developing and transition countries.  
                                                     
11 Krastev (2007, p 60) describes the “victory of the anti-egalitarian consensus”, which united the ex-
communist elite, motivated by self-interest, and the anti-communist counter-elite, motivated by ideology.  
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6. Annex 
Table A1: Descriptive Statistics 
Variable  Mean Std. dev. 
Market preferable 1 if resp. prefers market economy to other form of economic system 0.428 0.50 
Democracy Freedom House Nations in Transit index. Min 1: least democratic. Max: 
7: most democratic 
4.01 1.58 
Trust Sum of index of trust in government, parliament, courts and political 
parties. Min: 1. Max: 4. 
1.17 1.46 
2.64 0.57 Demand for 
redistribution 
Support for state intervention to reduce "the gap between the rich and the 
poor". Min: 1. Max: 3.   
Democracy*Demand for redistribution 10.62 4.83 
Democracy*Trust 4.01 5.59 
Trust*Demand for redistribution 0.46 1.06 
Democracy*Trust*Demand for redistribution 10.39 15.15 
    
Age   46.94 16.98 
Age squared  2491 1691 
Gender 1 if male  0.48 0.5 
Self employed work as self employed at their main job (regardless occupation) 0.08 0.28 
Education categories:    
No education  0.05 0.22 
Compulsory education  0.16 0.37 
Secondary education  0.22 0.41 
Professional education  0.37 0.48 
University degree  0.19 0.39 
Post-graduate education  0.01 0.09 
Occupation categories    
Unemployed Actively looking for a job. waiting for an answer or find no job available 0.09 0.29 
White collar worker  0.17 0.38 
Blue collar worker  0.18 0.38 
Service worker   0.12 0.32 
Farmer or farm worker  0.05 0.22 
Pensioner  0.21 0.41 
Student  0.03 0.16 
Housewife  0.06 0.25 
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Figure 1: Support for the Market and Income Inequality 
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Figure 2: Support for the Market and Preferences for Income Redistribution by the State 
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Figure 3: Preferences for Redistribution and Income Inequality 
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Figure 4: Plot of Predicted Values for OLS and Logistic Regression for the Estimation of 
Equation (3) 
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